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Property as Prophesy: Legal
Realism and the Indeterminacy
of Ownership
John A. Humbach*
Property law, like all law, is indeterminate. This
means that ownership itself is indeterminate and every
owner is vulnerable to challenges based on unexpected
legal rules or newly created ones. Even the most
seemingly secure rights can be defeated or compromised
if a clever-enough lawyer is retained to mount a
challenge. The casebooks used in first-year property
courses are full of examples. In the case of particularly
valuable property, such as works of art, the motivation
to fashion arguments to support ownership challenges is
obvious. Short and strictly interpreted statutes of
limitations can mitigate the risks to ownership by
cabining the timeframes from which title challengers
can draw facts to support their claims.
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I. Introduction
Property is a fundamental and pervasive social practice. In
everyday interactions, people recognize, respect, and reaffirm
“ownership” in a myriad of different ways. There are many similarities
between the law of property and the social practice. In both, for
example, owners are viewed as having a variety of special advantages
or benefits, including, most prominently, the right to have or possess
the things they own; the right to exclude others from them; and,
generally, the right to deal with them more or less as they please. The
* Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.
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law of property and the social practice are, however, different in
important respects. Perhaps most important: when compared with the
law, ownership in the social practice of property is not a particularly
complex concept. In everyday social interactions, a person either owns
something or does not. In the law of property, by contrast, the
conception of ownership is far less simple.
Because the law of property and the social practice are different, it
is possible for the two to give different answers on questions of who
owns what. The law, of course, takes precedence, but only if someone
invokes it. This does not mean, however, that the social practice of
property necessarily follows the law on questions of ownership. What is
more accurate to say is that, as long as the players in the social practice
do not takes steps to invoke the legal system to resolve disputes, the
social practice of property generally ignores the intricacies and vagaries
of the law. Meanwhile, ownership in the social practice of property is
constantly affirmed and reaffirmed in the ways people deal with one
another in ordinary social interactions. Legal ownership is, by
comparison, rarely declared by the institutions of the legal system and
almost never reaffirmed at law. Consequently, attributions of ownership
under the social practice of property almost surely predominate over
legal ownership in people’s property consciousness. When the law does
intervene in ownership disputes, however, the outcomes are as likely as
not to go against the social practice. Even as a purely legal matter,
such outcomes are largely unpredictable.
There are practical and theoretical reasons for this divergence and
unpredictability. The practical reason is that lawyer time is expensive,
and persons having legal expertise usually do not get professionally
involved in (or, at least, they do not spend much time on) cases whose
resolution is “clear cut” or “easy.” Lawyers are only likely to get
seriously involved in ownership disputes when they believe the issues,
either of law or fact, are at least plausibly contestable, with sound
reasons in support of outcomes going either way. That is to say, there
must ordinarily be a fair degree of uncertainty as to how a legal dispute
will come out before a client will want to spend money on the lawyer
hours needed to seek a legal determination. This pre-requisite of
uncertainty is in and of itself enough to make the outcomes of legal
disputes notably unpredictable.
The theoretical reason for the divergence lies in the intrinsically
indeterminate nature of the law itself. Although there is little debate
about who owns what in the usual social practice of property (meaning
most property rights seem more or less secure from serious challenge),
one should not be lulled into thinking that most property rights are
relatively secure at law. Nor should one assume that it only makes sense
for people to take property disputes to court in those cases where the
social practices provide no clear answer. Whether an ownership dispute
is plausibly contestable, and therefore fit for a lawyer’s attention, is
never a purely objective matter; it is never a question whose answer
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depends solely on applying a fixed set of legal rules to objectively
relevant facts. Even if it seems clear that a person owns a particular
item under the relevant social practices, or even under the law, a skillful
lawyer can often persuade a court to take the property away from the
person who has it and give it to somebody else. That is to say, a lawyer
who is adept at discovering and advocating alternative bases for
decisions, drawn from the vast array of conceptual resources that the
law provides, can make a case plausibly contestable and therefore
unpredictable.
II. Ownership Indeterminacy
Standard first-year property-law casebooks are filled with cases of
putative owners who faced surprising challenges to their ownership,
often resulting in partial or total losses of valuable property.1 Even
though these erstwhile owners had no reason to doubt their ownership
under the social practice or law of property, it turned out that some
unexpected legal technicality (which they probably didn’t even
understand) meant somebody else, completely unsuspected, was
declared the actual owner. And even when these challenged owners
managed to avoid losing their property entirely, the trip they had to
take up the judicial ladder—perhaps all the way to their state’s highest
court—was hardly a painless or inexpensive adventure.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote that the law is simply “[t]he
prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious” than that.2 For Holmes, the common law was not an
objectively ordered, “brooding omnipresence in the sky”3—not a body
of rules existing “out there” like Plato’s Forms for judges to discover,
declare, and woodenly follow to resolve disputes. On the contrary,
Holmes suggested that the only law that can be known, as opposed to
predicted, is the law that was applied in the past, which can be seen
by looking back at what judges have done in already-decided cases.4
This “Legal Realism” of Justice Holmes, as carried forward by the
modern Critical Legal Studies movement, places great—some would say
excessive—stress on the fact that law, by its very nature, is always in
some degree indeterminate. Different lawyers can make different
predictions about “what the courts will do in fact,”5 but no one can say
1. See, e.g., SUSAN FLETCHER FRENCH & GERALD KORNGOLD, CASES AND
TEXT ON PROPERTY (6th ed. 2015); JOHN G. SPARKLING & RAYMOND R.
COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2d ed. 2012).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897).
3. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.).
4. Holmes, supra note 2.
5. Holmes, supra note 2.
CaseWesternReserve Journal of International Law 49 (2017)
Property as Prophesy
214
with certainty what the outcomes will be in future cases. As one scholar
has explained, judges have “tremendous leeway”6 to decide cases more
or less as they see fit:
Depending upon how a judge would read the . . . precedents, she
would extract different rules of law capable of generating
conflicting outcomes in the case before her. . . . [T]he choice of
which rules to apply in the first place is not dictated by the law
and . . . competing rules will be available in almost any case which
reaches the stage of litigation.7
As every modern lawyer knows and often takes for granted, these
possibilities make the law, as well as the actual outcomes of specific
cases, very susceptible to advocacy.
Observations about the law’s indeterminate nature apply equally
to legally enforceable property rights, which cannot be predicted
(except through educated guesses) by reference to legal rules. Even the
most confident declaration that “O owns X” is only a prophesy of what
a court will do, and such prophesies are always subject to challenge and
possible refutation in litigation. No matter how confident the prophesy,
a sufficiently skilled lawyer will always be able to invoke various
competing rules whose force may undercut the current putative owner’s
claim. For the court deciding the case, “the choice of which rules to
apply . . . is not dictated by the law.”8 And therein lies the fundamental
indeterminacy of ownership.
But this is not all: a court not only has a choice of which rules to
apply, but also the option of abolishing old rules and making up entirely
new ones if a skillful lawyer can persuade it to do so.9 A simple case
showing this indeterminacy in action is Nelson v. Parker.10 There, a
widower deeded a house to his son, Daniel, but the deed clearly showed
that the widower’s live-in companion, Irene, was intended to have the
house for life through a life estate.11 Daniel, preferring not to wait until
Irene’s death to take the house, hired a lawyer to remove her.12 The
normal legal rule for cases like this is straightforward: when interpreting
6. Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 209 (1986).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. (“[L]eeway enabled judges, in effect, to rewrite the rules of law on
which earlier cases had been decided.”).
10. Nelson v. Parker, 687 N.E.2d 187 (Ind. 1997).
11. Id. at 188.
12. Id. at 187.
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a deed, the grantor’s clear intention controls.13 Based on this rule,
Irene’s life estate should have prevailed. On appeal, however, Daniel’s
lawyer added indeterminacy to the case by digging up an obscure, old
rule to the effect that a “reservation” in a “stranger” (someone not
party to the deed) is void—meaning the deed’s words meant to create
Irene’s life estate would have no legal effect.14 Irene’s lawyer then urged
the court to abolish the old rule,15 arguing that it no longer served its
original purpose. In other words, Irene’s lawyer suggested that the court
should take a major chunk out of Daniel’s property rights by
eliminating an obscure legal wrinkle that Daniel’s lawyer had unearthed
and asserted.
The court ultimately ruled against Daniel and abolished the old
rule. But the important point for present purposes is that the case
illustrates how readily a pair of skilled advocates can provide a court
with essentially complete discretion in making its decision. Even though
no law compelled it to do so, the court chose to use its discretion to
transfer valuable property rights from Daniel, who perhaps did not
morally deserve them, to Irene, who perhaps did.16
Nelson v. Parker represents one of the many examples in standard
property-law casebooks that illustrate (albeit perhaps unintentionally)
the fundamental indeterminacy of property rights.17 We may feel that
the court made the right choice in Nelson v. Parker, and we may cheer
that the court had a choice at all, but the possibility of such choices is
exactly what makes property titles indeterminate and vulnerable to
advocacy.18 Modern American property law rests on a continuous
succession of precedents that go back nearly 1000 years, and in a body
of law going back that far, there is probably always some old rule,
combination of rules, or vague principles or policies that a resourceful,
13. See id. (“[T]he object of deed construction is to ascertain the intent of the
parties.”); see also Brown v. Penn Cent. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind.
1987) (“[T]he object of deed construction is to ascertain the intent of the
parties.”).
14. Nelson, 687 N.E.2d at 188 (“[A]t common law a grantor could reserve an
interest only for the grantor, but not for a third person, or ‘stranger’ to
the deed.”).
15. The old rule was indeed still the law of the state, reinforced by the court
in Ogle v. Barker, 68 N.E.2d 550, 553–54 (Ind. 1946). See also Nelson,
687 N.E.2d at 189.
16. Whatever Irene’s rights may have been under the law of property as it
existed at the time of the deed, it is fair to say that she would surely have
been regarded as the rightful owner of the deeded interest under the usual
social practice of property. It is not part of the social practice of property
that an owner’s right to transfer property as he pleases can be torpedoed
by obscure legalities excavated from another age.
17. See, e.g., SPARKLING & COLETTA, supra note 1.
18. See Altman, supra note 6 (“[L]eeway enabled judges, in effect, to rewrite
the rules of law on which earlier cases had been decided.”).
CaseWesternReserve Journal of International Law 49 (2017)
Property as Prophesy
216
motivated lawyer can dig up and cobble together to make a colorable
case. And, if even there is not, an imaginative and resourceful lawyer
could almost always make at least a plausible argument for abolishing
one of the existing rules or creating a new one. Even if the resulting
line of argument is not a guaranteed winner, it can be sufficiently
compelling to cast a cloud on title and pry loose a handsome
settlement—a possibility that is limited only by the attacking lawyer’s
imagination and resourcefulness. As I remind my students, nobody’s
property is safe as long as there’s a sharp-eyed lawyer out there looking
for a way to persuade a court to give it to someone else.
Of course, the picture presented here perhaps exaggerates the
indeterminateness of property rights, just as legal-realism jurisprudence
has exaggerated the indeterminateness of law itself. After all, most of
the law, as a real-life influence on everyday human conduct, is not at
all indeterminate, but rather reliable and predictable virtually all of the
time. And indeed, the legal system’s reliance on largely voluntary legal
compliance could not function if this were not the case.
Nevertheless, the law’s relative predictability in ordinary life is not
of much relevance or comfort in the world of legal practitioners or
others professionally engaged with the law. For in the cases that occupy
the attention of lawyers, the law is, essentially by definition,
“indeterminate,” otherwise there would be no actual or potential
controversy requiring the lawyer’s time. Nobody pays lawyers to think
about cases that seem clear beyond the possibility of cavil or doubt.
The only cases that lawyers regularly deal with are ones that are, or
reasonably may be, contested.19 Similarly, even though legal property
rights are generally well understood and seem quite “determinate” as a
matter of social practice, the professional world inhabited by lawyers is
a world of indeterminate laws and ever-available bases, legal and
factual, to contest other people’s property rights.
III. Getting Property by Creating New Rules:
DeWeerth v. Baldinger
A striking example of how skillful lawyers can persuade courts to
create new legal rules in order to divest and reassign property rights is
the World War II art-theft case of DeWeerth v. Baldinger.20 At issue
19. To be sure, many lawyers spend a lot of time and receive substantial fees
for thinking about matters that are not currently being contested. A
principal purpose for engaging lawyers in these matters is to head off
burdensome lawsuits in the future. One reason that the law usually
appears to be determinate is simply that it may not seem worth anyone’s
while to fashion arguments that challenge most of the conventionally
predicted results.
20. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev’d 836 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1987), on motion for reconsideration 804 F. Supp. 539
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was the ownership of a painting by Claude Monet, called Champs de
Blé à Vétheuil.21 In 1957, three decades before the case arose, Edith
Baldinger purchased the painting and placed it in her home on Park
Avenue in New York City.22 As it turned out, however, the Monet had
been stolen in 1945 from a home in Germany during the chaotic
aftermath of World War II.23 Eventually, a Geneva art dealer took the
painting to New York and, through the Wildenstein & Co. gallery, sold
it to Mrs. Baldinger.24 When Mrs. Baldinger bought the painting, she
was entirely unaware that it was stolen property.25 The same was
probably also true of Wildenstein and possibly the Geneva art dealer,
although they surely knew that a large amount of stolen art was floating
around Europe at the time.
In the early years following the 1945 theft, Mrs. DeWeerth made
various inquiries and efforts to find her stolen painting, all to no avail.26
It was not until 1981 that a chance discovery by her nephew revealed
that Wildenstein had been involved in selling the painting in 1957.27
Once a court compelled Wildenstein to divulge the stolen painting’s
whereabouts, Mrs. DeWeerth made a formal demand on Mrs. Baldinger
to return it.28 Mrs. Baldinger refused.29
In early 1983, nearly 40 years after the theft, Mrs. DeWeerth sued
in federal court to recover the painting from Mrs. Baldinger.30 The
threshold question was whether German or New York law should
apply.31 Under German law, Mrs. DeWeerth’s cause of action would
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994); see also JOHN A.
HUMBACH, WHOSE MONET? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICA LEGAL
SYSTEM (2d ed. 2016) (discussing the case at greater length, as a vehicle
for introducing and demonstrating the operation of the American
common-law system).
21. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp, at 690.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 692.
24. Id. at 691.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 691–92.
29. Id. at 692.
30. Id.
31. Federal courts sitting in a diversity-jurisdiction case are supposed to apply
the law of the state in which the court is located. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The applicable choice-of-law rules and property
law in DeWeerth v. Baldinger was, therefore, the law of New York.
DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp, at 692 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Ele. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
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have expired many years before,32 which would have meant an easy
victory for Mrs. Baldinger.33 Mrs. DeWeerth’s lawyers obviously wanted
to persuade the court to not use Germany’s law, and it was here that
they introduced the first major indeterminacy into the case, arguing
that the court should apply New York law instead.34 The choice-of-law
question required the court to engage in, among other things, a
subjective significant-relationship analysis,35 which was, despite its
major impact on property rights, not very determinate. But Mrs.
DeWeerth’s lawyers succeeded in getting Germany’s unfavorable law
out of the case, and the question then became: What is the applicable
statute-of-limitations period for actions to recover chattels in New
York? This question turned out to be not so easy to answer, producing
plenty of ownership indeterminacy for the lawyers to feast on.
The legal situation was essentially this: the New York statute of
limitations states flatly that an action to recover a chattel “must be
commenced within three years,” which sounds fatal for Mrs.
DeWeerth’s claim.36 Long before, however, New York courts had been
persuaded to add a new proviso to the statute’s flatly stated rule.
According to this judicial proviso, when a stolen chattel is held by a
good-faith buyer, the three-year period does not even begin to run until
the owner demands the chattel and the good-faith buyer refuses to
return it.37 This court-invented proviso not only guts the curative effects
32. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 937 (Ger.), translated
in GERMAN CIVIL CODE: BGB, http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html [https://perma.cc/YS64-
6YFJ] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (“(1) A person who has a movable thing
in his proprietary possession for ten years acquires the ownership
(acquisition by prescription). (2) Acquisition by prescription is excluded
if the acquirer on acquiring the proprietary possession is not in good faith
or if he later discovers that he is not entitled to the ownership.”).
33. Id. According to German Civil Code § 937(1), good title had
presumptively ripened in somebody in Germany before the painting was
brought to New York, unless someone could prove the absence of 10 years’
good-faith possession that would trigger the exclusion in subsection (2).
Without such proof, Mrs. Baldinger received good title under German law
at the time of her purchase in 1957, quite apart from any title that she
could assert based on her own long period of good-faith possession.
34. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Gerda Dorothea DeWeerth at IV(C), DeWeerth
v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994) (Nos. 93-7144, 93-7146), 1993
WL 13029840.
35. DeWeerth, 658 F.Supp. at 692.
36. N.Y. CPLR § 214 (McKinney 2016).
37. Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d on other
grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969). The original theory was that,
until the good faith purchaser had refused a demand for the chattel, there
was no wrong to trigger the statute of limitations. See Kunstsammlungen
Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
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of the nominal three-year statute of limitations, but also has a dramatic
value-shifting impact on property rights, to the detriment of innocent
buyers like Mrs. Baldinger. Following the New York precedents,
however, the District Court held that the three-year statute of
limitations had not run and rendered a judgment for Mrs. DeWeerth.38
The court ordered Mrs. Baldinger to return the painting that she had
held in good faith for more than 25 years.39
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.40 The court decided to let
Mrs. Baldinger keep the painting because Mrs. DeWeerth had failed to
use reasonable diligence to find it after it was stolen.41 Notably, the
Second Circuit treated Mrs. DeWeerth’s insufficient diligence as the
pivotal fact of the case, even though New York law, which the court
was supposed to follow,42 had no rule requiring owners to use reasonable
diligence.43 The Second Circuit conceded that New York had no such
rule, but was convinced that the requirement was a good idea and that
New York courts would embrace it once the opportunity arose. So, in
deciding DeWeerth v. Baldinger, the Second Circuit created a new rule
of property, requiring reasonable diligence, and then used that rule to
deprive Mrs. DeWeerth of the property rights she had under the state
law that it was supposed to apply. To put it bluntly, Mrs. Baldinger’s
lawyers persuaded the Second Circuit to invent a brand new legal rule,
to add it to the property law of another jurisdiction, and then to use
its newly-minted rule to take property away from Mrs. DeWeerth and
give it to Mrs. Baldinger.
Creating new rules of law in the course of adjudication is, of course,
not unheard of. On the contrary, it has long been considered at the
very core of our common-law system, the source of the flexibility the
common law needs to respond to new conditions.44 When courts make
new rules in the adjudication of ownership disputes, however, the result
38. DeWeerth, 658 F.Supp. at 694.
39. Id. at 695.
40. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987).
41. Id. at 112.
42. Id. at 109–12.
43. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429–
30 (N.Y. 1991) (acknowledging that New York has case law holding that
a plaintiff in replevin must make a demand for the return of chattels
within a reasonable time, but that no New York case had applied the
reasonable-time requirement to owners who did not know the location of
their property).
44. A key exception to this general acceptability is in the field of
constitutional law, where new judge-made rules can be seen to have the
effect of “amending” the Constitution—a matter of grave concern to
advocates of originalism and strict construction. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A
GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 140 (4th ed. 2006).
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can be to reassign property rights from one person to another, as in
DeWeerth v. Baldinger.45 Such ad hoc reassignments of property rights
are an ever-present possibility (and litigation temptation) as long as
skillful advocates trying to salvage “losing” cases are able to persuade
courts to create new rules or drop old ones, just because it seems like a
good idea based on reasons of better policy. It is an important factor
that makes property rights fundamentally indeterminate—and ever
vulnerable to the sharp-eyed lawyer who seeks to wrest them away.
The Second Circuit’s decision for Mrs. Baldinger was not, however,
the end of the story. In 1991, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected
the Second Circuit’s new rule of “New York” law, holding that a
requirement of reasonable diligence did not further the state’s policy of
protecting the owners of stolen property.46 The court also added
pointedly that “the Second Circuit should not have imposed a duty of
reasonable diligence on the owners of stolen art work for the purposes
of the Statute of Limitations.”47
This was not, however, a happy ending for Mrs. DeWeerth. After
New York clarified its law on reasonable diligence, DeWeerth v.
Baldinger made a second trip through the federal courts.48 The District
Court again held for Mrs. DeWeerth based on the 1991 state decision,49
while the Second Circuit again held for Mrs. Baldinger.50 Although the
Second Circuit acknowledged that it had previously made the wrong
call on New York law, it nevertheless stayed with its original decision
for Mrs. Baldinger in the interest of “finality.”51 Finality is, to be sure,
an important principle, but it is not an inflexible one. In a case like
this, the Second Circuit almost surely could have gone either way.52 As
if to provide a stark example of property law’s indeterminacy and
vulnerability to advocacy, the Second Circuit chose to stick with its
previous, though now demonstrably erroneous, outcome. Consequently,
Mrs. DeWeerth was legally deprived of her property even after her
45. DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1273.
46. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 430 (1991).
47. Id.
48. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); DeWeerth v.
Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994).
49. DeWeerth, 804 F.Supp at 554.
50. DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1276.
51. Id. at 1275.
52. Ironically, the Second Circuit later cited DeWeerth v. Baldinger in a case
where it held that exceptions to finality should be “liberally construed
when substantive justice will thus be served.” LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 248
F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Radack v. Norwegian Am. Line
Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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right—as confirmed by the indisputably highest authority possible—
had become as determinate as a property right could be.53
IV. Statutes of Limitations Reduce the Indeterminacy
of Property Rights
Even though the Second Circuit got the New York law exactly
wrong, for which Mrs. DeWeerth paid the price, the court may have
had the better end of the matter for at least two policy reasons. First,
in seeking to give force to the statute of limitations and cut off a theft
victim’s long-stale claim, the Second Circuit chose the policy that would
most likely protect people’s reasonable and legitimate property-right
expectations. That is, the court chose a policy that was best adapted
to align the law of property with the social practice of property. Second,
and perhaps more important, by extending the statute of limitations’
power to cure title uncertainties, the Second Circuit acted to limit the
risks that flow from the indeterminacy of property rights. These two
reasons will be considered in turn.
There is much to be said for the idea that courts should endeavor
to decide property cases in accordance with the expectations that
people have based on the social practice of property. This is not, of
course, what courts generally purport to do. More typically, courts
purport to follow the law faithfully, wherever it may lead. Still, if a
court were inclined to decide ownership disputes in accordance with the
social practice of property, it would generally have wide latitude to do
it.54 Exercising that latitude would probably mean first and foremost
trying to avoid conferring unexpected windfalls on some while visiting
rude and ruinous surprises on others. Such windfalls and surprises are,
virtually by definition, at odds with the social practice of property.
Perhaps it was something akin to this kind of thinking that
underlay the Second Circuit’s stiff insistence on holding for Mrs.
Baldinger even after New York’s highest court made it unambiguously
clear that Mrs. DeWeerth was the true owner of Champs de Blé à
53. DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1276. It is assumed that the Second Circuit’s
decision could not constitutionally or jurisdictionally change the law of
New York, but only misdeclare it. Mrs. DeWeerth was therefore the owner
of the painting before the litigation began and continued to be the owner
under the only body of law—state law—that could apply to determine
the painting’s ownership. There was no federal property law that could
apply, so the Second Circuit’s ruling could not change the legal fact that
Mrs. DeWeerth continued to be the painting’s owner even after the
Second Circuit’s original decision to the contrary—unless, of course, legal
property rights do not really exist all but are only prophesies of what
courts will do.
54. See Altman, supra note 6 (“[L]eeway enabled judges, in effect, to rewrite
the rules of law on which earlier cases had been decided.”).
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Vétheuil.55 By the time Mrs. DeWeerth sued Mr. Baldinger, nearly 40
years after the painting was stolen, Mrs. DeWeerth had likely long since
given up any real hope of ever getting it back. Notwithstanding her
rekindled hopes after her nephew helped to uncover the painting’s trail,
Mrs. DeWeerth probably did not count very heavily on its return as
she moved into her 90s. By contrast, after paying a respectable sum to
acquire the Monet from a reputable art dealer, Mrs. Baldinger had
prized and possessed it for decades without question of her right to do
so, when suddenly she faced a coterie of strangers determined to pull it
off her wall.56 Almost certainly, a decision for the true owner in
DeWeerth v. Baldinger would have been experienced as a pleasant but
unexpected windfall for Mrs. DeWeerth and a distinctly rude surprise
for Mrs. Baldinger.
To be sure, the very substantial loss originally inflicted on Mrs.
DeWeerth cannot be denied. Anyone who has lost her valuable
possessions to a thief has suffered a major injustice, but that does not
mean it is justice to inflict exactly the same loss on innocent others.
Transferring injustice from one to another may be satisfying to the
latter, but it hardly can be called “justice.” It merely replaces one
injustice with another. More generally, Mrs. DeWeerth and Mrs.
Baldinger represent two different interests that are shared by every
property owner: (1) the interest in being able to regain possession in
the event of theft or loss; and (2) the interest in being able to invest in
property, in good faith, without fear of having it taken away due to
unforeseen claims challenging the title. In any contest over stolen or
lost property, these two interests will compete, but they are
nevertheless interests that every property owner shares.
One function of statutes-of-limitations is to provide a rough balance
between these two competing interests. Longer limitations periods tend
to push the balance in favor of true owners; shorter periods tend to
favor innocent buyers who invest in property in good faith and may be
equally deserving of the law’s concern. But no matter how short the
nominal statutory period may be, exceptions to statutes of limitations,
such as discovery rules57 or New York’s demand-and-refusal
55. DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1269.
56. Id.
57. Discovery rules delay the running of the statute of limitations until the
true owner has discovered the item or would have discovered the item by
use of reasonable efforts. See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J.
1980) (“The discovery rule provides that, in an appropriate case, a cause of action
will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable
diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts which form the basis of a
cause of action.”).
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requirement,58 tend to skew the balance in favor of erstwhile “true”
owners at the expense of innocent purchasers.
When one of two innocent parties must suffer, the presumably
preferable approach is to lay the loss on the one who will suffer less.59
In this context, the least-sufferer would be the one whose expectations
are likely weaker or non-existent. That person would normally be the
one who has already lost possession and, due to lapse of time, has little
or no realistic hope of getting it back. This person’s reasonable
expectations of future possession would almost always be weaker than
those of a person who has not only possession, but also every reason to
believe that she has good title, especially if she paid a substantial price
in good faith.60
Furthermore, assuming that the law generally favors investments
in private property and seeks to encourage the acquisition and
possession of things, such as works of art, it makes sense for the law to
place a higher priority on providing security for innocent buyers and a
lower priority on the erstwhile owner’s interest in regaining wrongfully
taken or lost property. For one thing, every owner is an acquirer, and
every acquirer has an interest in being protected from unknown,
potential claims attacking the title conveyed by the transferor.61
Although owners also want to be able to regain items that might later
be lost or stolen, that interest is contingent and speculative, dependent
on future events that can only be controlled to some extent, such as by
theft-prevention measures. As such, the interest in regaining possession
58. Id. at 868; see also Judith Wallace, New York’s Distinctive Rule
Regarding Recovery of Misappropriated Art After the Court of Appeals’
Decision in Mirvish v. Mott, 3 SPENCER’SARTL. J. 17, 18 (2012) (describing
New York’s demand-and-refusal requirement).
59. This would seem, at least, to be the utilitarian or consequentialist solution
to the problem, and deontological analysis seems, to me at least, to be a
dead end. Specifically, if taking somebody’s possession is a kind of moral
wrong that can never be justified by “lesser-evil” consequentialist
considerations, then the law should never intervene to take possession
from one innocent person and give it to another. Another consequentialist
approach is to place the loss on the one who could have avoided it at the
lowest cost. Ordinarily, the lowest-cost avoider is the theft victim because
it is usually easier to protect property from theft than to verify the
transferor’s title to a chattel, especially absent a system of title
registration.
60. The cognitive distortion known as the “endowment effect” provides
another explanation. The effect describes people’s tendency to value a
thing more highly when they already have it and face the possibility of
losing it, as compared with the value they place on things they do not yet
possess. See, e.g., The Endowment Effect: It’s Mine, I Tell You,
ECONOMIST (Jun. 19, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/11579107
[https://perma.cc/QJT4-K5XX].
61. Gary D. Sesser & Kenneth S. Levine, Art Buyer’s Due Diligence: Do You
Own It Free and Clear?, 1 SPENCER’SART L. J. 8, 8 (2010).
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seems entitled to a lower priority than owners’ present and immediate
interest in retaining the things that they already possess. After all, it
seems far more probable that a person would be deterred from investing
in property by the possibility of loss due to hidden vulnerabilities in a
transferor’s title than by the potential difficulty of recovering the
property if thieves take it.62 A general legal policy to encourage and
support investment in property should take this difference into account.
Perhaps the most important reason for prioritizing owners’ interest
in receiving protection from title challenges, and therefore skewing the
statute-of-limitations balance in favor of innocent purchasers, is that
property rights are fundamentally indeterminate. Because the law
places virtually no limit on either the “competing rules . . . available in
almost any case”63 for mounting a challenge to another’s property
rights, or on and the “choice of which rules to apply in the first place,”64
property will likely remain vulnerable to ownership challenges as long
as there are sharp-eyed lawyers looking for ways to get it. But the law
can, at least, adopt and enforce strict and short statutes of limitations
to cabin the timeframes from which title challengers can draw facts to
support their “competing” claims. Shorter and stricter statutes of
limitations will tend to favor parties whose claims to ownership are
based on the simple, hard-to-contest facts of actual possession, which
lie at the core of the social practice of property. Prioritizing owners’
interests in protection against transferor title defects would particularly
support investment in property categories, such as works of art, which
can be valuable, portable, and notoriously shadowy in their chains of
title. Longer limitations periods only encourage potential challengers to
look for and latch onto ambiguities in the apparent facts of the past as
bases for claims. To reduce the hazards of buying and selling art,65 laws
should likewise reduce the risks posed by sharp-eyed lawyers through
shorter limitations periods.
V. Conclusion
Like all law, property law is indeterminate, which means that
ownership itself is indeterminate. Even the most seemingly secure
ownership rights are mere prophesies, and these prophesies can fail if a
62. To be sure, the law’s commitment to restore stolen goods to their rightful
owners can help to reduce theft by working as a potential deterrent. Given
the criminal penalties that exist, however, as well as the relative rarity of
successful restorations, it is doubtful whether strengthening owner’s rights
to regain possession provides a significant deterrent to theft.
63. Altman, supra note 6.
64. Altman, supra note 6.
65. Although the law on the subject is contested, at least one court has held
that sellers can be subject to liabilities far exceeding the selling price under
the implied warranty of title for sales of goods. Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d
742, 745–46 (N.Y. 1969).
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clever lawyer mounts a challenge. Every owner is therefore vulnerable
to some degree to challenges based on new or unexpected legal rules
that tend to support a re-assignment of ownership from one person to
another. Where valuable property is concerned, such as works of art,
lawyers have obvious incentives to fashion arguments in support of
reassignments of ownership to their clients.
Legal rules that lengthen the time to sue for lost or stolen property
dilute the ability of statutes of limitation to cure title uncertainties,
real or contrived. This dilution cannot be justified by the added
protection that such lengthening provides for the erstwhile owner’s
interest in regaining lost possession. For most owners, the marginal
protection afforded by an augmented right to regain possession is more
than offset by the increased danger to owners’ interest in retaining
valuable property that has been purchased in good faith.
